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I . INTRODUCTION
1. Standard Trade Theory
The standard theory of international trade^ has for
a long time relied on the assumptions and the model of perfect
competition. International economists call for free trade
which is part of the general theory for free markets. Free
market analyses depend on the market system where scarce
resources are allocated via prices generated from supply and
demand
.
In the case of international trade, economists argue that
free trade exploits each country's comparative advantage and
leads to an efficient allocation of resources. Free trade
leads to specialization in production according to availabil-
ity of resources and costs of production. For example, a
country like the United States would specialize in producing
capital-intensive goods while a country like Bangladesh would
specialize in producing labor-intensive goods, and England
would be involved in industries that depend on using coal
^See J. Bhagwati, 1964, "The Pure Theory of International
Trade: A survey". The Economic Journal 74, (March), p. 4.
See also J. S. Chipman, 1965, "A Survey of Theory of
International Trade: Part 1, The Classical Theory."
Econometrica 33, (July), p. 477.
See also J. S. Chipman, 1965, "A Survey of the Theory of
International Trade: Part 2, The Neo-classical Theory,"
Econometrica 33, (October), p. 685.
resources, and so on. This specialization would lead to
greater overall production. These countries would then trade
freely so that consumers can obtain the products they would
like to consume.
International economists have long opposed trade
restrictions imposed by governments. They argue that they
distort the allocation of resources to less efficient uses and
distorts prices.
2. New Developments in Trade Theory
Recently, it has been recognized that a significant
proportion of international trade takes place between
countries with similar production/consumption characteristics.
It has been pointed out by some economists that some charac-
teristics of international trade forces it to deviate from the
standard trade theory and perfect competition. Krugman (1983)
suggests that much of the world's trade in manufacturing
occurs between industrial countries with similar relative
factor endowments, and involves two-way exchanges of goods
produced with similar factor proportions^. The perfectly
competitive model is inappropriate when there are large start-
up or overhead costs, learning-by-doing, and research and
development, as has been noted by Brander (1986) . Also, it
^Paul R. Krugman, 1983, "New Theories of Trade Among
Industrial Countries," American Economic Review . AEA Papers
and Proceedings, (May), p. 343.
fails to address the issues raised by firms and policymakers.
Avinash Dixit (1984) points out that some industries involved
in international trade might face increasing economies of
scale rather than constant costs, as assumed in the model of
perfect competition, and become oligopolistic as these
industries come to consist of few and large multi-national
firms. The model of perfect competition is less able to
incorporate entry barriers created by technological features
or by government's actions. Dixit also points out that
product differentiation is another factor that reduces the
size of the competing market and increases the market power
of firms. Finally, this deviation from the standard trade
theory might be due to marketing and trade when these
activities are carried out by a few trading corporations.''
Because of these factors the standard trade theory seems
incapable of answering many of today's questions about
international trade. Thus, alternative models to explain the
nature of trade have been hypothesized. These alternative
models adopt ideas from other fields of economics.
Looking at the factors discussed above, there is so much
integration between international trade and industrial
^James A. Brander, 1986, "Rationales for Strategic Trade
and Industrial Policy," in: Paul R. Krugman, ed. , Strategic
Trade Policy and the New International Economics , the MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. 25.
*Avinash K. Dixit, 1984, "International Trade Policy for
Oligopolistic Industries," Economic Journal . Conference Papers
94, pp. 1-2.
organization since international trade has the characteristics
of an oligopolistic market structure. Thus, economists have
begun to analyze international trade using theories of
imperfect competition developed by industrial organization
economists.
It makes sense to analyze trade policy using models that
are at least capable of describing most of today's trade
actions noting that the volume of trade between two countries
is larger the closer their economies are to being on the same
level. Also, the two-way trade between these two countries
involves goods that have similar production processes and
produce goods with similar factor proportions. As Dixit has
pointed out:
The combination of international trade and
industrial organization produces several features
of analysis that are novel to the workers in the
separate areas. For international economists, there
are new aspects of competition, such as quality,
advertising, research and development, new
dimensions of firm's behavior including strategic
moves such as threats and promises, and new
equilibrium concepts appropriate to imperfectly
competitive markets, for example Cournot. For
industrial economists, there are new reasons for
inter-firm cost differences, namely international
differences of factor prices, transport costs,
taxes, and tariffs.^
In response to this matter, in the past few years many
economists and theorists (for example, Basevi, Brander and
Spencer, Dixit, Eaton and Grossman, Krugman, and others) have
^Avinash K. Dixit, 1984, "International Trade Policy for
Oligopolistic Industries," p. 3.
begun analyzing international trade using new models to
replace the standard trade theory. They have focused on rent
shifting, increasing the domestic welfare, and protecting
domestic industry using export subsidies, export taxes, R&D
subsidies, tariffs and so on. These new models often rely on
restrictive assumptions which are probably inevitable given
the inherent complexity of the world.
In this report I will attempt to follow the steps of
Krugman in sketching out two concepts which recently have been
recognized as a means to explain international trade. The
first is the concept of "intraindustry" trade, where scale
economies as well as comparative advantage are a major cause
of trade and gains from trade. The second is the concept of
technological competition, which emphasizes international
competition in research-intensive industries.^
3. Organization of the Report
This report is organized as follows. The next section
contains a discussion of the theory of intra-industry trade.
The theory of technological competition and its policy
implications are discussed in section III. Section IV focuses
on the reaction of foreign governments in response to home
government policies and the interaction between governments.
Finally, Section V contains some policy implications and
concluding remarks.
^Paul R. Krugman, 1983, "New Theories of Trade Among
Industrial Countries," p. 343.
II. INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE THEORY:
Traditional trade theory is less able to describe trade.
An important alternative theory is the theory of intra-
industry trade. This theory does not depend only on the
comparative advantage, but on the assumption of the existence
of substantial economies of scale in the industry.
Intra-industry trade is trade in which a country imports
and exports the same or similar goods, and may have the same
factor proportions in production.
Since World War II, however, a large and
generally growing part of world trade has come to
consist of exchanges that cannot be attributed so
easily to underlying advantages of the countries
that export particular goods. Instead, trade seems
to reflect arbitrary or temporary advantages
resulting from economies of scale or shifting leads
in close technological races.
^
Two kinds of trade in this theory should be recognized:
intra-industry trade based on comparative advantage, just as
what the traditional trade theory suggests, and intra-industry
trade based on economies of scale. The industrial structure
of a country's production and the level of intra-industry
trade is largely determined by relative factor endowments.®
If one country has a comparative advantage and lower costs in
its imperfectly competitive industry than the other, then the
^Paul R. Krugman, 1986, "Introduction: New Thinking About
Trade Policy," in: Paul R. Krugman, ed. , Strategic Trade
Policy and the New International Economics , the MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. 7.
®Paul R. Krugman, 1983, "New Theories of Trade Among
Industrial Countries," p. 344.
low cost country will be a net exporter of the output of its
imperfectly competitive industry.^ Countries with similar
factor endowments have fewer differences in their industrial
structure, and more intra-industry trade.
Intraindustry trade theory depends on the existence of
large economies of scale which means that markets cannot be
perfectly competitive. Firms that are able to produce for
both domestic and foreign markets will thus have lower costs.
High levels of technology, high fixed costs, natural barriers,
or even government barriers may lead to an imperfect market
structure.
In analyzing these markets, assume the case of
oligopolistic competition following the studies of Krugman
(1984), Brander and Spencer (1984a, 1984b, 1985), and Dixit
(1984) . Two firms, domestic and foreign, are assumed to exist
in oligopolistic markets. Domestic consumption consists of
goods produced by the domestic firm and goods produced by the
foreign firm. There exists product differentiation and
products may and may not be perfect substitutes. Both firms
face declining costs of production and have economies of
scale. For simplicity, it is assumed a single product is
produced by each firm. Goods are assumed to be sold in
segmented markets which means that each firm produces for each
^Anthony J. Venables, 1985, "Trade and Trade Policy with
Imperfect Competition: The Case of Identical Products and
Free Entry." Journal of International Economics 19, p. 11.
market separately and can differentiate prices. Firms produce
output to supply the domestic consumption and to export what
is left. Finally, it is assumed higher transport costs for
the exporting firm. This ensures that the home firm captures
a larger share in the domestic market.
The equilibrium of this industry is assumed to be
Cournot. Firms are aware that their actions affect the price
they receive. They are also aware of their market power and
their ability to charge different prices in different markets.
Each firm recognizes that its profit depends in part on what
its rival does.
Each firm is doing the best it can in terms of maximizing
profits given the output of its rival. In Cournot equili-
brium, price and output end up somewhere between the monopoly
and perfectly competitive outcomes. Firms cannot earn the
maximum profit that could be achieved. Thus, for a firm to
earn greater profits it should produce more, thus forcing the
rival firm to cut back output.^" Therefore, firms compete in
both markets in order to capture a larger share of the market
and increase profits.
Firms are assumed to have an equal footing in the
marketplace. Therefore, a firm would not take an action
without expecting a similar reaction from the other firm.
Hence, for a firm to increase its profits, via having a larger
"j. A. Brander, 1986, "Rationales for Strategic Trade
and Industrial Policy," p. 27.
share of the market supply, it has to have lower costs than
its rival. If a firm could manage to have lower costs, the
two-firm industry would move to a new Cournot equilibrium
which involves a higher market share and output for the firm
with lower costs, and a smaller share and output for the firm
with the higher costs. Increasing the output of the firm
through lower costs will force the other firm to find ways to
lower its costs or cut back its output as it realizes
increased competitiveness. The contraction by the rival
increases the price charged since the rival firm would move
up its marginal cost curve. These processes would benefit the
lower cost firm.^^
In a case like this, government intervention is
important, either by imposing import tariffs, subsidizing
exports, or using other policies to help the home firm to
capture a larger share in the market; the government can help
to maintain or stand against its rivals and keep its existing
market share. Some of these policies and goals will be
discussed later.
An example where Intra-Industry trade theory applies is
the wide-body jet aircraft industry which comes as close as
any industry to being a classic oligopoly. ^^ It is generally
believed by the industry analysts, the market has "room" for
11Ibid, p. 28
^^Ibid, p. 31
two actual producers to produce the next generation of planes,
though there are three potential producers: Boeing,
McDonnell-Douglas, and Airbus. ^^ The large fixed costs and
the high technology in the industry generate elements of a
natural monopoly.
Historically, this industry seems to enter a game that
is repeated whenever a new generation of aircraft comes onto
the scene. Three or four potential producers always start
each race, with fewer —usually only two— efficient "winners"
in each round. ^* Airbus is a European government cartel, which
is supported by European governments, whereas the American
producers are supported by military sales.
A successful policy should be taken by each firm and its
supporters (e.g. European governments) in order to stay in the
market as a "winner" at the end of each round. Here we see
the need for government intervention to help the home firm in
its race against its rivals.
An argument based on an empirical analysis suggests that
intraindustry trade consists predominantly of goods that are
not merely differentiated but instead are different in design
and application. The results of this study is argued to be
^^W. H. Branson and A. K. Levorick, 1986, "Strategic
Behavior and Trade Policy." in P. R. Krugman, ed. , Strategic
Trade Policy and the New International Economics . MIT Press,
Cambridge, MAssachusetts, p. 245.
^*Ibid, p. 245
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consistent with intraindustry trade emerging as a way of
embracing potential gains from specialization. This study
argues that intraindustry trade is consistent with increased
international specialization made possible by improved access
to national markets. It also argues that intraindustry trade
reflects the specialization of trading partners in producing
product variants in which each has some special expertise.
This study calls for free trade and argues that outside
pressures for liberalization will find less and less industry
opposition as trade flows increase. ^^
It could be argued that the results of that study are not
against intraindustry trade and the use of strategic policy
since the markets used to analyze intraindustry trade are for
goods that are less technology-intensive. Intraindustry trade
theory is assumed to be applicable for industries requiring
higher technology-intensive goods.
Another empirical study analyzing the Europe-Japan
rivalry in the EEC car market supports intraindustry trade and
the use of strategic policies. However, it found that a small
increase in the present European tariff could be welfare
improving and that the export subsidy policy could be the best
^ H. P. Marvel and E. J.Ray, 1987, "Intraindustry Trade:
Sources and Effects on Protection," Journal of Political
Economy 95, p. 1279.
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policy/^ The results of the study agree with the assumptions
and goals of intraindustry trade and strategic policies.
1. Tariff Protection PolicY
This section analyzes the use of tariff protection and
export subsidy policies undertaken by the government to
support the home firm. Tariff protection and export subsidy
policies are the most common tools used in such cases.
The argument for tariffs arose originally as a way of
raising revenue. Imposing tariffs on imported goods transfers
profits from the foreign firm to the government treasury. The
only economically justifiable argument for using tariffs as
a strategic policy in traditional trade theory is to protect
the infant-industry. The idea behind this argument is that
any new firm or industry needs a sufficient time to be able
to compete with foreign rivals. Hence, temporary protection
using tariffs might be justified to protect a domestic
industry, since this protection would give this industry a
chance to grow, become more efficient, and finally compete
with foreign rivals. This argument must rely on the idea of
generating positive economies of scale among the firms in the
industry or the claim that firms cannot make efficient long
run investments through capital markets. If the firms are not
^^D. Laussel, C. Montent, and A. Peguin-Feissolle, 1988,
"Optimal Trade Policy Under Oligopoly. A Calibrated Model of
the Europe-Japan Rivalry in the EEC Car Market," European
Economic Review 32, p. 1564.
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protected, they would always have the incentive to go through
a period of losses in order to make long-run gains. This is
considered to be a weakness of this argument.
Recently, some arguments have been raised for using
tariffs as a strategic policy. In this report I will look at
those arguments related to oligopoly cases and especially to
our model. Before discussing these arguments, we must
consider the effect of tariffs on the market equilibrium.
Following the assumptions previously discussed, the
market would have a Cournot equilibrium as illustrated in
Figure 1. In Figure 1, Fj represents the domestic firm's
reaction function and Fj the foreign firm's reaction function.
Notice that the foreign firm's reaction function is flatter
since we assumed higher transport costs paid by the foreign
firm. The vertical axis measures the foreign firm's output
Y, while the domestic firm's output X is measured on the
horizontal axis. The initial Cournot equilibrium will occur
at point E, where the domestic firm's reaction function curve
intersects with the foreign firm's reaction function curve.
Figure 2 illustrates this equilibrium using marginal cost
analysis. The domestic firm's estimated marginal cost is
represented by the curve m(M*) , and the curve m*(M) represents
the estimated marginal cost of the foreign firm. Domestic
^^J. A. Brander, 1986, "Rationales for Strategic Trade
and Industrial Policy." p. 27.
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Foreign Finn's
Output
^6
1
Dcmestic Firm's Output Reaction Functions
Foreign Finn's Output Reaction Functions
Domestic Firm's
Output
Figure 1. Tariff protection effect on output reaction
functions.
Source: Paul R. Krugman, 1984, "Import Protection as Export
Promotion: International Competition in the Presence
of Oligopoly and Economics of Scale," in: Henryk
Kierzkowski, ed. , Monopolistic Competition and
International Trade
, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, p. 186.
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Foreign Finn's
Estimated Marginal
Cost
Danestic Firm's I'larginal Cost Functions
Foreign Finn's
r^arginal Cost txmctions
fJ (/i-)' Domestic Firm's
Estimated
Marginal cost
Figure 2. Tariff protection effect on marginal cost
Source: Krugman, 1984, p. 186.
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marginal cost is decreasing in foreign, foreign marginal cost
is decreasing in domestic marginal cost. If the domestic firm
can reduce m, the domestic firm's output reaction function in
Figure 1 will shift out, resulting in an increase in domestic
firm's output and a decrease in foreign firm's output. Given
that marginal cost functions are decreasing in output, foreign
firm's marginal cost m* will go up as its output decreases.
That is why /i* is decreasing in /i. Also, in the same way it
could be shown that n is decreasing in m** The market equi-
librium occurs where the marginal cost equals the marginal
revenue for each firm and this is assumed to be at point S
where the schedules m(M*) and m*{M) cross without any kind of
intervention.
Now, we consider a tariff imposed on imported goods.
This would shift the curve /x*(M) right to ^J.*i^J.) ', which means
a higher cost for every unit produced by the foreign firm.
This in turn will lower the domestic firm's marginal costs
which is a function of ^i* (the foreign firm's marginal cost),
and shift the curve m(M*) left to ^J.(^J,*) '. Thus, we will have
a new equilibrium at point T with a higher marginal cost for
the foreign firm and a lower marginal cost for the domestic
firm.
Going back to Figure 1, the shift in the marginal cost
curve of the foreign firm would shift the firm's reaction
function curve in to Ff'. The domestic firm reaction function
16
would shift out with the new level of marginal cost. The new
market equilibrium will occur at point D.
As a result of this mechanism, the share of the foreign
firm will be less than before. Less foreign firm output, Y,
will be produced. Its marginal and average costs will be
higher at the new equilibrium level. On the other hand, the
marginal and the average costs of the domestic firm will
become lower as its output and share increase due to economies
of scale.
1.1 Profit Extraction
In imperfectly competitive markets, firms may earn
economic profits if the price charged for goods exceeds the
marginal cost. The firm with the larger market share would
gain higher economic profits. Hence, it seems to be in the
domestic interest to capture some of the foreign firm's rent
through protectionism. Protectionism is likely to be an
attractive policy from a domestic point of view.
This argument has been raised by Brander and Spencer
(1981, 1984) . They have developed a model assuming the
existence of a domestic firm and a foreign firm supplying the
domestic consumption. Both firms initially gain economic
profits. Tariffs then could be used as a strategic policy to
shift profits from the foreign firm to the domestic firm.
17
Also it might shift foreign profits to the government treasury
and increase government income through tariff revenue.
In our model rent-shifting may occur as a result of
imposing tariffs on imported goods which means shifting the
marginal cost curve of the foreign firm, /i*(M)' This shift
in /i*(M) would increase the price charged by the foreign firm
in order to lower its reduced profits and decrease its output
since it is incapable of maintaining its share by lowering its
costs. The domestic firm now has a chance to increase its
output and sales obtaining higher profits as its marginal cost
curve, m(M*)» shifts inward as a result of the shift in the
foreign firm's marginal cost curve. The domestic firm
reaction function, in turn, would shift out providing higher
output and higher profits for the domestic firm. The domestic
firm also is able to charge higher prices for its output since
the price charged by the foreign firm is higher to increase
its profits.
"j. A. Brander and B. J. Spencer, 1984, "Tariff
Protection and Imperfect Competition," in: Henryk Kierzkowski,
ed. , Monopolistic Competition and International Trade . Oxford
University Press, Oxford, p. 199.
18
1.2 Export Promotion
Export promotion is another recent argument for
protectionist policies. This argument has been raised by
Krugman (1984) , and is related to the infant-industry argument
but does not require capital market failures or externalities
to apply. ^^
No doubt the argument that import protection
is export promotion is often a self-serving position
of those who would like protection themselves.
Still, there is undeniable persuasiveness to the
argument. Yet it is an argument which economists
schooled in standard trade theory tend to find
incomprehensible. In a world of perfect competition
and constant returns to scale, protecting a product
can never cause it to be exported. It may cause
some other good which is complementary in production
to be exported - but this is hardly what the
businessmen seem to have in mind.
Krugman 's model, which he has developed to analyze his
argument, is based on similar assumptions to the assumptions
we have assumed previously. The assumptions of a domestic and
a foreign firm producing a single product that is not a
perfect substitute. Both firms compete in segmented markets
and face transport costs. Finally, the important element in
Krugman 's analysis is the existence of economies of scale and
declining marginal costs.
^^J. A. Brander, 1986, "Rationales for Strategic Trade
and Industrial Policy." p. 32.
^°P. R. Krugman, 1984, "Import Protection as Export
Promotion; International Competition in the Presence of
Oligopoly and Economics of Scale," in: Henryk Kierzkowski,
ed. , Monopolistic Competition and International Trade , Oxford
University Press, Oxford, p. 180.
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The idea behind this argument is that restricting a
particular market, or subset of a market, to certain firms,
helps those firms in other markets. "By giving a domestic
firm a privileged position in some one market, a country gives
it an advantage in scale over foreign rivals. This scale
advantage translates into lower marginal costs and higher
market share even in unprotected markets."
To illustrate this, suppose that the home government
imposes tariffs on imported goods to exclude the foreign firm
at least from some part of the domestic market. This action
would increase the domestic firm's output and reduce the rival
output in the protected market. Holding ix, home firm's
estimate of marginal cost constant, the increase in n* , the
foreign firm's estimate of marginal cost would shift m(M*)
left and lower the estimated marginal cost which in turn would
cause m*(M) to shift up. That is, for a given level of
foreign marginal costs, domestic costs fall; for a given level
of domestic marginal costs, foreign costs rise. The change
in the domestic firm's marginal cost causes F^Fd to shift out
and X to increase. On the other hand, F^Ff shifts in and Y
falls due to the change in the foreign firm's marginal cost.
These changes would lead to lower marginal costs for the
domestic firm and a larger share in all markets. Protecting
21Ibid, p. 245
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the domestic firm in the domestic market increases domestic
sales and lowers foreign sales in all markets. ^^
2. Export Subsidies Policy
The analysis of export subsidies is similar to the
analysis of import tariffs. Using the previous assumptions
we could trace out the effects of export subsidies paid by the
home government to increase the pie share of the domestic firm
in the world market and extract profits from the foreign firm.
Starting out from a Cournot equilibrium dominating the
industry, we would explain the strategic use of export subsidy
policy using marginal cost curves and the reaction function
curves. Remember that the only way for a firm to capture a
larger share of the market in a Cournot equilibrium is to have
lower costs than its rivals. For a firm to increase its
output, its rival's output must decrease. Therefore, a firm
cannot increase its output without a credible decrease in its
costs. At the equilibrium point, neither firm can decrease
its costs by itself. Hence, government actions in setting a
subsidy make it credible for a domestic firm to have lower
costs since subsidies have the same effect as lower costs.
A subsidy to the cost of producing extra output
makes it in the firm's interest to expand output,
even taking the other firm's output as given. There-
fore, the firm's expansion of output is credible.
The rival firm can best respond by contracting out-
put. In effect the subsidy makes it possible for
the domestic firm to stake out a larger market share
22Ibid, p. 187.
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of a profitable international market than it other-
wise could. ^^
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the effects of subsidies on
our equilibrium model. Suppose the home government sets a per
unit subsidy for a produced good. This subsidy shifts the
home firm's marginal cost, /x(/i*), left generating lower costs
at every level of production. This shift in Ai(/i*) has a two-
way effect: On one hand, it shifts the home firm reaction
function out representing the expansion in the domestic firm's
output. On the other hand, it affects the foreign firm's
function through shifting the foreign firm's marginal cost
curve, /i*(ju), which in turn shifts in the foreign firm
reaction function representing the counteraction in the output
level of the foreign firm.
As a result of this subsidy the market equilibrium will
move from point E to point D with a higher level of output for
the domestic firm X, and lower Y, the foreign firm output
level. At the new equilibrium level the domestic firm will
have a lower marginal cost and the foreign firm will have a
higher marginal cost. The domestic firm gains higher profits
with the subsidy in this case while the foreign firm gains
less profits than the original situation without subsidy. In
this case the subsidy shifts rent from the foreign firm to the
domestic firm.
"j. A. Brander, 1986, "Rationales for Strategic Trade
and Industrial Policy." p. 29.
22
Foreign Finn's
Output
Donestic Firm's Output Reaction Functions
Foreign Firm's Output Reaction Functions
Domestic Firm's
^Output
d 'b
Figure 3. Export subsidies effect on output reaction functions
Source: Krugman, 1984, p. 183.
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Foreign Firm's
Estimated Marginal
Cost
Af*
DcxTiestic Firm's Marginal Cost Functions
Foreign Firm's
Marginal Cost Functions
Domestic Firm's
Estimated
Marginal Cost
/J
Figure 4. Export subsidies effects on marginal costs
Source: Krugman, 1984, p. 186.
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The main goal for subsidies is to shift rent from foreign
rivals, but the domestic firm also gains from subsidies which
is a transfer from taxpayers to shareholders of the firm via
the domestic treasury. In fact, because of "strategic"
effect, rent-shifting profits to the domestic firm rise by
more than the amount of the subsidy.^*
This argument has been raised by James Brander and
Barbara Spencer (1985) and their findings have received much
attention from academic researchers and policy analysts
because it seems to provide theoretical support for a targeted
industrial policy. ^^
Brander and Spencer argue that subsidies do not only
increase domestic profit and reduce foreign profit, but also
lower the world price of the goods and at the same time it
actually increases domestic welfare net of the subsidy.
Export subsidies may help the domestic firm to move from
a Cournot equilibrium to a Stackelberg output leader as
pointed out by David de Meza.^^ The government could commit
^^Ibid, p. 29.
"Gene M. Grossman, 1986, "Strategic Export Promotion:
A Critique." in: P. R. Krugman, ed. , Strategic Trade Policy
and the New International Economics . MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, p. 48.
^^J. A. Brander and B. J. Spencer, 1985, "Export Subsidies
and International Market Share Rivalry, : Journal of
International Economics 18, p. 87.
^^Dave de Meza, 1986, "Export Subsidies and High
Productivity: Cause or Effect?" Canadian Journal of
Economics , p. 348.
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itself to paying an export subsidy before output level is
chosen. Also, he argues that the countries with the lowest
cost would set the highest subsidies. That is, at the Cournot
equilibrium each firm maximizes profit given the level of its
rival's output, and when a firm expands from the Cournot
equilibrium, part of its increased sales will be matched by
a reduction. in the output of its rival. Hence, the subsidized
firm will have higher profits due to the fraction of increased
output that is transferred from its rival. The lower a firm's
marginal cost, the higher profits it gains from selling more
at the initial price. In this way the low-cost country has
the most incentive to encourage its home firm to expand and
• 28therefore pays the highest subsidy.
The export subsidy is higher given the smaller the number
of domestic firms. ^^ A larger number of domestic firms or
freedom of entry makes it less likely that an export subsidy
yields gains. That is, the potential profits yielded by an
export subsidy will tend to be dissipated by the new entry or
increased domestic competition.^"
Notice that the tariff policy and the subsidy policy have
the same or similar effects in capturing larger shares in the
^^Ibid., p. 349.
^^A. K. Dixit, 1984, "International Trade Policy for
Oligopolistic Industries." p. 12.
^°D. Collie and D. de Meza, 1986. "Inadequacies of the
Strategic Rationale of Export Subsidies," Economic Letters 22,
p. 372.
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market and gaining higher profits by the domestic firm as can
be recognized from the previous figures. But in fact, there
are some differences in the results of using tariffs or
subsidies. Tariffs affect the foreign firm's marginal cost
and output reaction functions first, which in turn affect the
domestic firm's marginal cost and output reaction functions.
Subsidies lower the domestic firm's marginal cost and affect
the domestic firm's marginal cost and output reaction
functions before affecting the foreign firm's marginal cost
and output reaction functions.
Tariff increases the government revenue and the domestic
firm's profits. On the other hand, it increases the world
price of the goods and lowers the world welfare. Prices will
be higher in all markets and the quantity demanded will be
less as the prices increase. It also reduces the domestic
consumption. Hence, domestic as well as foreign welfare is
lowered by the tariffs. ^^
Subsidies differ from tariffs in that it lowers the world
price of the goods and increases the world welfare. Even
though subsidy is a transfer from taxpayers to the firm's
shareholders, it increases domestic welfare net of the
subsidy. ^^
^^J. Brander and B. Spencer, 1984, "Tariff Protection and
Imperfect Competition," p. 200.
^^J. Brander and B. Spencer, 1985, "Export Subsidies and
International Market Share Rivalry," pp. 87-88.
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III. THE THEORY OF TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITION
Another important theory that has been developed to
analyze today's trade among industrial countries is the theory
of technological competition. This theory, however, suggests
that in some manufacturing sectors there may be a strong
temptation for countries to engage in protectionist or
• « • * 33interventionist policies.
Technological competition theory differs from the
previous theory, intra-industry theory, in that it does not
depend on the assumption of decreasing marginal costs or
economies of scale. The basic concept of this theory is that
firms try to lower their costs through expenditures on R&D.
Firms can compete technologically, investing in R&D to lower
their costs, develop new products, or both. Firms or
countries with better technology have lower costs.
International trade therefore has the effect of
magnifying welfare differences associated with
differences in technology, and insuring that the
gains from trade are proportionately greater for the
country with superior technology. The reason for
this is essentially that, with trade, firms in the
country with superior technology can expand at the
expense of foreign firms, so moving down and along
their average cost curves, and forcing foreign firms
back and up their average cost curves.^*
"p. R. Krugman, 1983, "New Theories of Trade Among
Industrial Countries," p. 345.
^*A. J. Venables, 1985, "Trade and Trade Policy with
Imperfect Competition: The Case of Identical Products and Free
Entry," p. 11.
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Firms in the industry under consideration try to compete
and be more efficient in production. Each firm invests in
R&D in order to discover more efficient methods to exploit raw
materials and have lower costs. Higher technology means lower
costs and higher output. A firm captures a larger share of
the market if it succeeds in achieving lower costs than its
rivals.
The firm profit in this case is revenue minus production
costs, transport costs, and expenditures in R&D. In the home
market, the foreign firm incurs higher transport costs than
the domestic firm.
"A proper theory of technical progress in oligopoly must
be dynamic, considering how market conditions affect and in
turn are affected by the research and development activities
of the firms. "^^ Recently, several studies have attempted to
come up with models that best fit the theory of technological
competition, for example, Spencer and Brander (1983) , Dixit
and Stern (1982), Venables (1985), and Krugman (1983 and
1984)
.
In this section, following the steps of Krugman, we
discuss a model similar to the one in the previous section
assuming the existence of a domestic and a foreign firm
competing in several markets including each firm's home
^^A. K. Dixit and N. Stern, 1982. "Oligopoly and Welfare:
A Unified Presentation with Applications to Trade and
Development," European Economic Review 19, p. 135.
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market. Marginal costs in this section are assumed to be
constant. The marginal cost of production is independent of
the level of output, that is no economies of scale exist, but
is decreasing in the amount of investment in R&D by the firm.
The higher the investment in cost-reducing R&D by the firm the
lower its marginal costs. Each firm takes the other firm's
output and level of technology as given. Finally, it will be
shown that investment in R&D has an effect on profits which
is proportional to expected sales, that is, firms have
increasing returns.
This analysis will start with the assumption that the two
firms are at a Cournot equilibrium, as illustrated in Figure
5 at point E and Figure 6 at point M. The equilibrium is
based on each firm's level of investment in R&D and level of
output given the other firm's level of investment in R&D and
level of output. Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium in
terms of investment in R&D. In Figure 5, N(N*) is the R&D
reaction function of the domestic firm and N* (N) is the R&D
reaction function of the foreign firm. Each firm's optimal
investment in R&D is declining in the other's investment. N
represents the level of the domestic firm's investment in R&D,
while N* represents the foreign firm's level of investment in
R&D. It is assumed that the higher the level of investment
in R&D, the lower will be marginal production costs, and thus,
the higher will be output. On the other hand, the larger the
30
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N
Figure 5. Effect of R&D subsidies on R&D reaction functions
Source: Krugman, 1984, p. 189.
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output the greater the marginal profitability of R&D, so the
level of investment is increasing in output.
Figure 6 illustrates the equilibrium in terms of output.
The industry will initially be at equilibrium at point M,
where the two reaction functions cross. This represents the
market share of each firm holding the level of technology
constant. Output and market share depend on marginal costs
which depend on the amount of investment in R&D. An increase
in cost-reducing R&D by the home firm will then lower its
marginal cost, shift its reaction function outward and
increase its output and market share. ^^
Suppose, however, that the domestic firm increase its
investment in R&D through R&D subsidies paid by the home
government or through import protection which would lower the
expected marginal cost. This policy change would shift N(N*)
outward having a two-way effect, the shift in N(N*) will shift
the domestic firms reaction function outward. And, on the
other hand, will shift the foreign firm's R&D reaction
function, N*(N), which is decreasing in the home firm's
investment in R&D. The shift in N*(N), in turn, will shift
the foreign firm's output reaction function leftward. As a
result the market equilibrium will move from point M to point
N yielding higher output for the domestic firm and lower
^^P. R. Krugman, 1984, "Import Protection as Export
Promotion" International Competition in the Presence of
Oligopoly and Economies of Scale," p. 187.
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Figure 6. Effect of R&D subsidies on output reaction functions
Source: B. J. Spencer and J. A. Brander, 1983,
"International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy,"
Review of Economic Studies
^ 50, p. 709.
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output for the foreign firm and shifting profits from the
foreign firm to the domestic firm.
The expected return to a marginal dollar of R&D by the
domestic firm will raise as the firm's output increases, and
lower the expected return to a marginal dollar of R&D by the
foreign firm with lower output. Domestic R&D will be greater
than it would otherwise have been as a result of the shift in
the R&D reaction functions in the directions indicated by the
dotted lines in Figure 5; foreign R&D will be less. Because
the domestic firm's relative technological position is
improved, it may well increase its share in all markets.^''
Therefore, firms compete in achieving a superior
technological position and are more efficient in employing
technology. Hence, firms and countries compete in R&D, and
have more incentives to increase investment in R&D.
Findings by Grossman and Shapiro (1987) further suggest
that at a Cournot equilibrium the firm that is ahead in
technology and has lower costs has a greater incentive than
• • • 38
xts rival to engage in cost-reducing R&D.
1. RSD Subsidies Policy
The first policy of industrial strategy to be
considered in the case of technological competition is R&D
^^Barbara J. Spencer and J. A. Brander, 1983,
"International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Review
of Economic Studies 50, p. 709.
38Gene Grossman and Carl Shapiro, 1987, "Dynamic R&D
competition," The Economic Journal 97, (June), p. 385.
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subsidies. Without government intervention, firms are at a
Cournot equilibrium. Given each firm's own level of
technology and output based on its resources and given its
rival's level of technology and output, a firm cannot increase
its own investment in R&D by itself.
A domestic R&D subsidy makes it credible for the home
firm to increase its investment in R&D. The subsidy shifts
out the domestic firm's R&D reaction function which in turn
shifts in the R&D reaction function of the foreign firm,
increasing the domestic firm's R&D equilibrium and reducing
the R&D undertaken by the foreign firm.^^
Using the Cournot model, the output reaction function of
the domestic firm shifts out with R&D subsidies due to the
shift in the R&D reaction function of the domestic firm,
N(N*). The foreign firm's output shifts in providing a new
equilibrium with higher output level for the domestic firm and
a lower output level for the foreign firm. R&D subsidies
increase the domestic firm profits and extract rent from the
foreign firm to the domestic firm as domestic output increases
and foreign output decreases.
The optimal R&D subsidy, as it has been argued by Spencer
& Brander (1983) , maximizes domestic rent by shifting the R&D
reaction function of the domestic firm to a point where it
would have been the Stackelberg leader-follower point in R&D
39
P. R. Krugman, 1983, "New Theories of Trade Among
Industrial Countries," p. 34 0.
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space with no subsidy and without disturbing the Cournot
equilibrium behavior of the firm/"
This policy is more appropriate if there are no
spillovers of R&D, that is the domestic firm is able to
appropriate fully the return from RSD.*^
2. Transfer of Foreign Technology Policy
In the case when there are spillover effects of R&D
or transfer of technology to other firms which make the
innovating firm incapable of capturing the full return from
R&D, the other firm may still do well even if it is not first
in innovating a product, but is in a position to copy and
improve on major innovations being made by its rival.
In oligopolistic rivalry between a domestic firm and a
foreign firm, the rents earned by the domestic firm are most
likely to be reduced by any spillover of the domestic R&D to
the foreign firm. Hence, domestic benefits from R&D
investments and subsidies could be lowered as a result of
spillovers. This means that the domestic firm and industry
will be better off if it is in a position to take maximum
advantage of spillover of R&D from the foreign firm.*^
B. J. Spencer and J. A. Brander, 1983, "International
R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," p. 712.
41Ibid, p. 713.
*^B. J. Spencer, 1986, "What Should Trade Policy Target?"
in: P. R. Krugman, ed., Strategic Trade Policy and the New
International Economics
,
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
p. 78.
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Policies that could speed up the transfer of foreign
technology to the domestic industry seem to be appropriate to
use. This could be more beneficial to the domestic industry
and the domestic country will be better off if the government
aids the transfer of foreign technology. This policy has been
undertaken by the Japanese as a function of their industrial
development policies. For example, the Japanese semiconductor
industry has benefitted substantially from the U.S. R&D in
semiconductors. By the early 1980 's Japan had become a major
competitor in world markets, achieving significant gains in
global market share, largely at the expense of the U.S.
industry."
''^M. Borrus, L. D. Tyson, and J. Zysman, 1986. "Creating
Advantage: How Government Policies Shape International Trade
in the Semiconductor Industry," in: P. R. Krugman, ed.
,
Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics
.
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. 91.
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IV. GOVERNMENT-GOVERNMENT INTERACTION AND RETALIATION
So far, this analysis has been based on the assumption
that there is no interaction or retaliation among governments.
Government decisions in choosing a policy to benefit its home
industry are made taking those of the other governments as
fixed. In reality the policy choices of any government
interact with other government choices in many ways. It is
clear that other governments cannot be expected to let one
government get away with such policies and stand by with no
reaction. Therefore, any one country, when evaluating its
policy choices, must be mindful of the expected reactions or
retaliations from other countries.** Governments involved in
trade competition among industries see the world in more or
less the same way, and each government is assumed to target
maximizing its national welfare, and is assumed to recognize
the strategic possibilities present in the formation of
international trade policy.*^
There is no generally accepted theory of policy
interaction. One theory that is used to study the interaction
between two governments is a strategic structure known as the
"prisoner's dilemma". The basic idea of the "prisoner's
**A. K. Dixit, 1986, "Trade Policy: An Agenda for
Research," in: P. R. Krugman, ed. , Strategic Trade Policy and
the New International Economics . MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, p. 298.
*^J. A. Brander, 1986, "Rationales for Strategic Trade
and Industrial Policy," p. 36.
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dilemma" is that it generates three possible outcomes. The
first outcome is that there is no profit shifting if the two
governments cooperate and do not use any policies. The second
outcome comes about if one country refrains from an active
trade policy while the other actively protects imports or
promotes subsidies. In this case the latter one would gain
from strategic policies and the first one would lose from
being passive. The third outcome is the result of actively
using strategic policies by both governments. In this situ-
ation, both countries will have less profits than the first
outcome; that is, both countries will lose because of inter-
vention, but both countries would lose less than the country
who refrains from active trade policy in the second outcome.''^
Brander argues that in the problem of choosing the
subsidy level, the government should subsidize the firm.
It really does not matter whether the other country
has a strategic subsidy or not; the best response
for either country is to use a subsidy also.
However, the actual benefit of a subsidy is much
higher if the other country does not use a subsidy
too. Both producing countries would be better off
if neither used the subsidy, but the unilateral
incentive to use the subsidy is clear.*''
Countries cannot cooperate to use an optimal policy
because there is a high incentive for governments to "cheat"
*®J. D. Richardson, 1986, "The New Political Economy of
Trade Policy," in: P. R. Krugman, ed.
,
Strategic Trade Policy
and the New International Economics . MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, p. 271.
"j. A. Brander, 1986, "Rationales for Strategic Trade
and Industrial Policy," p. 38.
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and gain much higher profits, at least in the short run.
Countries cannot be forced not to cheat and to abide by
treaties they sign.
Therefore, there should be a strategy that could be used
to insure the cooperative outcome. One approach is called
"tit for tat" ; this states that the government should
cooperate if the rival had cooperated the last time and defect
if the rival had defected the last time. Another strategy is
the "trigger strategy", which is to cooperate as long as the
rival is cooperating, and to play the noncooperative move
forever when the rival defects. These approaches are limited
by several factors. First, the world is not a laboratory in
which experiments can be repeated. Second, it is very hard
to disentangle the effects that contribute to real policy
outcomes.*®
*°Ibid, p. 39.
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V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Recent studies in international trade have started to
apply some theories from oligopolistic competition to the
analysis of trade among industrial countries. This has
occurred because the standard trade theory which relies on
the assumptions of perfect competition does not always fully
describe today's trade with the increase in trade among
countries with similar economies.
This report has disucssed two theories. The first theory
is the theory of intra-industry trade which depends on the
existence of economies of scale. Firms compete in several
international markets to capture a larger share, hence,
benefit from having economies of scale to lower costs and gain
higher profits. Import protection policy may help the
domestic firm in capturing a larger share in the industry.
The problem with protectionism is that it lowers the welfare
of domestic consumers and the world welfare too. This policy
if matched by the foreign countries may harm both firms too.
Export subsidies policy also is a good policy to shift foreign
rent if there is no retaliation. An export subsidies policy
increases domestic welfare and lowers prices and is
recommended even with retaliation to minimize rent shifting
from domestic to foreign firms. The problem with import
protection and export subsidies policies is that these
policies violate international trade agreements such as GATT.
41
The second theory is the technological competition
theory. Firms try to capture a larger share through
investments in R&D to lower their cost. Firms with superior
technology gain higher profits by capturing a larger share in
the industry. Subsidizing R&D is one of the policies that
can be used to increase a domestic firms' profits. One
argument against subsidization is that R&D may have some kind
of spillover which may benefit the rival firm. Hence, it
might be more beneficial to the domestic firm to use the
second policy of aiding the transfer of foreign technology.
Transferring and modifying foreign technology may enable the
domestic firm to catch and take the lead in the industry.
The policy of R&D subsidies seems to be a good policy to
use even with the existence of spillover. That is, it
increases the world and domestic welfare, and with a
combination of some policies to minimize spillovers to the
foreign firm it may increase the share of the domestic firm
in the industry. Also, there is no conflict between this
policy and international trade agreements.
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Forms of oligopoly and imperfect competition seem to
characterize the nature of international trade among
industrial countries, which has long been assumed to be a form
of perfect competition in the traditional trade theory.
Recent developments in this area have applied some theories
of other fields of economics like industrial organization into
international trade.
In this report two theories have been considered to
explain some characteristics of today's trade where volume has
increased among countries with similar economies. The first
theory is the theory of intra-industry trade which depends on
the existence of economies of scale. Firms have lower
marginal costs as they increase their output. The industry
is assumed to be at a Cournot equilibrium. Firms gain higher
profits by capturing a larger share in the market and shifting
profits from the foreign rivals.
Theory of technological competition is the second theory
which assumes that firms compete in employing higher and more
advanced technology through investment in R&D which enables
them to have lower costs. The firm with superior technology
and larger investment in R&D has lower costs and a larger
share in the market. R&D subsidies and transfer of foreign
technology are two policies associated with this theory to
help the domestic firm in achieving a superior technology,
hence, gaining higher profits at the expense of foreign
rivals.
